How to Cite This Article
Abstract
Software supply chain security has emerged as a major area of focus for many organizations due to increasing reliance on cloud-based build environments, automated continuous integration/continuous delivery (CI/CD) pipelines, open source libraries, and third-party development tools. While traditional security assessments often look at each of these areas independently (i.e., assessing source code, evaluating software dependencies, and reviewing infrastructure configurations), doing so does not account for the fact that some of the most sophisticated types of attacks arise out of interactions among different aspects of the software development process, namely the build activity itself and dependency related risks. In response to this need, this research paper presents a holistic approach to security that links cloud-based build logs to dependency-related risk signals in order to provide better detection, investigation, and prevention capabilities against software supply chain attacks. This approach will utilize several components including: build event monitoring; vulnerability assessment of software dependencies; package provenance verification; behavioral anomaly detection; and contextual risk scoring. Organizations can use these components collectively to help identify when a software production process may have been compromised by identifying unusual build identity; unexpected modifications to a workflow; suspicious downloads of packages; vulnerable dependency versions; and deviations from normal build practices. In addition to presenting an architectural component view, the research also explores correlation techniques, operational issues, and evaluation criteria for deploying this type of approach in a cloud native development environment. Specifically, the research addresses explainability; scalability; reduction of false positives; and how it can integrate into existing DevSecOps practices. Ultimately, this research provides a conceptual framework for achieving greater transparency throughout the entire software production process as well as the dependency ecosystem.
Keywords
Software Supply Chain Security, Cloud Build Logs, Dependency Risk, DevSecOps, Build Provenance, Vulnerability Detection, Behavioral Analytics, Continuous Integration, Risk Correlation, Cloud Security
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